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The Roots of Controls on Pennsylvania's
General Assembly : Benjamin Rush's
1777 "Observations"
Introduction by Gerald C. Grimaud*
Because the Constitution of 1790 was such an extensive revision
of the 1776 Constitution and established the present form of our
government, it has sometimes been considered as the
paramount law to which the subsequent amendments by
convention and otherwise have been made.I

Conspicuously absent from discussions of late on judicial
review and the equalization of power between Pennsylvania's
branches of government 2 is an in-depth consideration of the issue in
early America. Lest guideposts be lost in the dust of time, it is
fitting that Benjamin Rush's3 Observations Upon the Present
Gerald C. Grimaud is a former Pennsylvania Assistant Attorney
General.
He is engaged in the general practice of law in his hometown of Tunkhannock,
Pennsylvania, including constitutional, criminal and civil rights law.
1.

See ROBERT

E.

WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7-8

(1985). Judge Woodside briefly addresses the history of Pennsylvania's five
constitutions (1776, 1790, 1838, 1874 and 1968) at pages 5-15 and in his appendix,
pages 567-582. Essential to understanding Pennsylvania's constitutional history is
J. PAUL SELSAM, PH.D., THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776 (1936).
2. See Jason Bologna, Comment, An Abuse of Power: How the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Uses Article V § 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitutionto Dominate
ProceduralLawmaking, and Why PennsylvaniaShould Amend this Constitutional
Provision, 71 TEMPLE L. REV. 711 (1998); see also Dana Stuchell, Comment,
Constitutional Crisis in Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania's Supreme Court vs.
Pennsylvania GeneralAssembly, 102 DICK. L. REV. 201 (1997).
3. WEBSTER'S NEW BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY (1983) contains this short
bio on Rush:
Rush, Benjamin. 1745-1813. American physician, educator, and patriot,
b. near Philadelphia. Practiced in Philadelphia (from 1769). Professor of
chemistry, College of Philadelphia (1769-91) and at U. of Pennsylvania
(1791). Member, Continental Congress (1776, 1777) and signer of
Declaration of Independence. Surgeon general of Continental army
(1777-78). Established first free dispensary in U.S. (1786).
Member,
Pennsylvania constitutional ratification convention (1787). Treasurer,
U.S. Mint (1797-1813). Author of Syllabus of a Course of Lectures on
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Government of Pennsylvania in Four Letters to the People of
4
Pennsylvania be republished, hereinafter Observations.
Rush, the Surgeon General of the Continental army from 1777
through 1778, was a member of the Continental Congress and a
signer of the Declaration of Independence.'
Twenty-six years
before Marbury v. Madison6 (1803) and eleven years before James
Madison's Federalist Paper No. 48,' Benjamin Rush published his
Observationsin 1777.
Within Rush's Observations are found, inter alia, the roots of:
(a) checks on Pennsylvania's legislative branch; (b) strengthened
judiciary; (c) entrenchment of Declaration of Rights (Article I § 25,
Reservation of Rights in People); and, (d) Article I § 18 (Attainder)
and § 19 (Attainder Limited), each addressed twelve years later by
Pennsylvania's
1789 constitutional
convention
and 1790
Constitution.8 Rush's theme can best be identified by his statement:
Farewell to Liberty, when the sacred bulwarks of a constitution
can be invaded by a legislature.
Rush reminds his readers that "Socrates and Barnevelt were
both put to death by Assemblies that held their powers at the
election of the people," and writes:
In a free government, the most inconsiderable portion of our
liberty and property cannot be taken from us, without the
judgment of two or three courts; but, by the Constitution of
Pennsylvania, the whole of our liberty and property, and even
our lives, may be taken from us, by the hasty and passionate
decision of a single Assembly.

Chemistry (1770; first chemistry textbook in U.S.), Medical Inquiries and
Observations (1789-98), Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the
Diseases of the Mind (1812; first psychiatric treatise in U.S.), etc.

4. Rush's Observations appears in

THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN

RUSH (Dagobert D. Runes, ed. 1947).

5. See supra note 3.
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding the judiciary is the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution and may strike down laws of Congress which
conflict with the Constitution).
7. See FEDERALIST PAPER No. 48 (Madison), regarding separation of powers
and judicial review. See also Irving Brant, THE BILL OF RIGHTS ITS ORIGIN AND
MEANING (1965).
8. Searching for the "origins of the peculiarly American doctrine of judicial
review of legislation" is most intriguing. See, e.g., William E. Nelson, Changing
Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the
States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1166 (1972).
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Our ancestors look down, and our posterity look up to us for a
happier Constitution.
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OBSERVATIONS UPON THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT
OF PENNSYLVANIA IN FOUR LETTERS TO THE
PEOPLE OF PENNSYLVANIA (1777)
Letter 1
EVERY free government should consist of three parts, viz. I.
A BILL OF RIGHTS. II. A CONSTITUTION. AND III. LAWS.
I. The BILL OF RIGHTS should contain the great
principles of natural and civil liberty. It should be unalterable by
any human power.
II. The CONSTITUTION is the executive part of the Bill of
Rights. It should contain the division and distribution of the power
of the people.-The modes and forms of making laws, of executing
justice, and of transacting business: Also the limitation of power, as
to time and jurisdiction. It should be unalterable by the legislature,
and should be changed only by a representation of the people,
chosen for that purpose.
III. LAWS are the executive part of a constitution. They
cease to be binding whenever they transgress the principles of
Liberty, as laid down in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.
Let us now apply these principles to the Bill of Rights,
Constitution and Laws of Pennsylvania. But previous to my
entering upon this task, I beg leave to declare, that I am not led to it
by a single party or personal prejudice; on the contrary, I honour
most of the friends of the present government as the warmest
Whigs among us, and I am proud of numbering several of the
gentlemen who were concerned in making, and in attempting to
execute the government, among my particular friends.
I. The Bill of Rights has confounded natural and civil rights
in such a manner as to produce endless confusion in society.
II. The Constitution in the gross is exceptionable in the
following particulars:
1. No regard is paid in it to the ancient habits and customs of
the people of Pennsylvania in the distribution of the supreme power
of the state, nor in the forms of business, or in the style of the
Constitution.
The suddenness of the late revolution, the
attachment of a large body of the people to the old Constitution of
the state, and the general principles of human nature made an
attention to ancient forms and prejudices a matter of the utmost
importance to this state in the present controversy with Great
Britain. Of so much consequence did the wise Athenians view the
force of ancient habits and customs in their laws and government,
that they punished all strangers with death who interfered in their
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politics. They well knew the effects of novelty upon the minds of
the people, and that a more fatal stab could not be given to the
peace and safety of their state than by exposing its laws and
government to frequent or unnecessary innovations.
2. The Constitution is wholly repugnant to the principles of
action in man, and has a direct tendency to check the progress of
genius and virtue in human nature. It supposes perfect equality,
and an equal distribution of property, wisdom and virtue, among
the inhabitants of the state.
3. It comprehends many things which belong to a Bill of
Rights, and to Laws, and which form no part of a Constitution.
4. It is contrary, in an important article, to the Bill of Rights.
By the second article of the Bill of Rights, "no man can be abridged
of any civil right, who acknowledges the being of a GOD;" but by
the Constitution, no man can take his seat in the Assembly, who
does not "acknowledge the Scriptures of the Old and New
Testament to be given by divine inspiration."
5. It is deficient in point of perspicuity and method. Instead
of reducing the legislative, executive and judicial parts of the
constitution, with their several powers and forms of business, to
distinct heads, the whole of them are jumbled together in a most
unsystematic manner.
6. It fixes all these imperfections upon the people for seven
years, by precluding them from the exercise of their own power to
remove them at any other time, or in any other manner than by a
septennial convention, called by a Council of Censors.
III. The laws and proceedings of the Assembly of
Pennsylvania are in many particulars contrary to the Constitution.
Only one half of the Members took the oath of allegiance,
prescribed in the tenth section of the Constitution. The Speaker of
the House issued writs for the election of Members of Assembly
and of Counsellors, notwithstanding this power is lodged, by the
19th section of the Constitution, only in the President and Council.
Two gentlemen were appointed Members of Congress, who held
offices under the Congress, which is expressly forbidden in the 11th
section of the Constitution. The Constitution requires further in
the 40th section, that every military officer should take the oath of
allegiance, before he enters upon the execution of his office; but the
Assembly have dispensed with this oath in their Militia Law. The
15th section of the Constitution declares, that no law shall be
passed, unless it be previously published for the consideration of
the People; but the Assembly passed all the laws of their late
session, without giving the People an opportunity of seeing them,
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till they were called upon to obey them. These proceedings of the
Assembly lead to one, and perhaps to all the three following
conclusions: First, That the Assembly have violated the principles
of the Constitution; secondly, that the Constitution is so formed,
that it could not be executed by the Assembly, consistent with the
safety of the State; lastly, that none of their laws are binding,
inasmuch as they are contrary to the superior and radical laws of
the Constitution. These considerations are all of a most alarming
nature. Farewell to Liberty, when the sacred bulwarks of a
Constitution can be invaded by a legislature!
And if the
Constitution cannot be executed in all its parts, without
endangering the safety of the State, and if all our late laws must be
set aside in a court of justice, because they were not assented to by
the People, previous to their being enacted, is it not high time for
the People to unite and form a more effectual, and more practicable
system of government? If strict justice should poise the scale in the trial of Tory
property, I can easily foresee from the virtue of the People, on
which side the beam would turn; but it becomes us to reflect, that
all trials for forfeited property must be held in courts of written law,
and the flaws of our Constitution and laws are so wide, that the
most gigantic Tory criminal might escape through them.
Letter II
I shall now proceed to say a few words upon particular parts of
the Constitution.
In the second section, "the supreme legislature is vested in a
'single' House of Representatives of the Freemen of the
Commonwealth."
By this section we find, that the supreme,
absolute, and uncontrolled power of the whole State is lodged in
the hands of one body of men. Had it been lodged in the hands of
one man, it would have been less dangerous to the safety and
liberties of the community. Absolute power should never be
trusted to man. It has perverted the wisest heads, and corrupted
the best hearts in the world. I should be afraid to commit my
property, liberty and life to a body of angels for one whole year.
The Supreme Being alone is qualified to possess supreme power
over his creatures. It requires the wisdom and goodness of a Deity
to control, and direct it properly.
In order to show the extreme danger of trusting all the
legislative power of a State to a single representation, I shall beg
leave to transcribe a few sentences from a letter, written by Mr.
JOHN ADAMS, to one of his friends in North Carolina, who
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requested him to favour him with a plan of government for that
State above a twelve-month ago. This illustrious Citizen, who is
second to no man in America, in an inflexible attachment to the
liberties of this country, and to republican forms of government,
writes as follows,
"Ithink a people cannot be long free, nor ever happy, whose
government is in one Assembly. My reasons for this opinion are as
follow,
1. "A single Assembly is liable to all the vices, follies and
frailties of an individual,-subject to fits of humour,-starts of
passion, 9 flights of enthusiasm,-partialities of prejudice, and
consequently productive of hasty results and absurd judgments. All
these errors ought to be corrected, and defects supplied by some
controlling power.
2.
"A single Assembly is apt to be avaricious, and in time
will not scruple to exempt itself from burdens, which it will lay,
without compunction, upon its constituents.
"A single Assembly is apt to grow ambitious, and after a
3.
time will not hesitate to vote itself perpetual. This was one fault of
the Long Parliament, but more remarkably of Holland, whose
Assembly first voted themselves from annual to septennial, then for
life, and after a course of years, that all vacancies happening by
death or otherwise, should be filled by themselves, without any
application to constituents at all.
"Because a single Assembly possessed of all the powers of
4.
government would make arbitrary laws for their own interest, and
adjudge all controversies in their own favor."1
If any thing could be necessary upon this subject, after such an
authority, I might here add, that Montesquieu-Harrington-Milton-Addison-Price-Bolingbroke, and others, the wisest
statesmen, and the greatest friends to Liberty in the world, have left
testimonies upon record of the extreme folly and danger of a
people's being governed by a single legislature. I shall content
9. A Committee of the Convention, which formed the Constitution of
Pennsylvania, published in the Pennsylvania Packet of October 15, 1776, as an
apology for one of their Ordinances, that was thought to be arbitrary and unjust,
that it was passed when "the minds of the Convention were agitated, and their
passions inflamed."
10. These reasons are given by our author for not lodging all power legislative,
executive and judicial, in one body of men. This has been done, as will be shown
hereafter in the Constitution of Pennsylvania: But, supposing it had been
otherwise, our author adds, "shall the whole power of legislation rest in one
Assembly? Most of the foregoing reasons (one is omitted) apply equally to prove,
that the whole legislative power ought to be more complex."
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myself with the following extract from the last of those authors.
The sentiments correspond exactly with those of our countrymen
before-mentioned.
"By simple forms of government, I mean such as lodge the
whole supreme power, absolutely and without control, either in a
single person, or in the principal persons of the community, or in
the whole body of the people. Such governments are governments
of arbitrary will, and therefore of all imaginable absurdities the
most absurd. They stand in direct opposition to the sole motive of
submission to any government whatsoever; for if men quit the
State, and renounce the rights of nature, (one of which is, to be
sure, that of being governed by their own will) they do this, that
they may not remain exposed to the arbitrary will of other men, the
weakest to that of the strongest, the few to that of the many. Now,
in submitting to any single form of government whatever, they
establish what they mean to avoid, and for fear of being exposed to
arbitrary will sometimes, they choose to be governed by it always.
These governments do not only degenerate into tyranny; they are
tyranny in their very institution; and they who submit to them, are
slaves, not subjects, however the supreme power may be exercised;
for tyranny and slavery do not so properly consist in the stripes that
are given and received, as in the power of giving them at pleasure,
and the necessity of receiving them, whenever and for whatever
they are inflicted."
I might go on further and show, that all the dissentions of
Athens and Rome, so dreadful in their nature, and so fatal in their
consequences, originated in single Assemblies possessing all the
power of those commonwealths; but this would be the business of a
volume, and not of a single essay.-I shall therefore pass on, to
answer the various arguments that have been used in Pennsylvania,
in support of a single legislature.
1. We are told, that the perfection of every thing consists in
its simplicity,- that all mixtures in government are impurities, and
that a single legislature is perfect, because it is simple.-To this I
answer, that we should distinguish between simplicity in principles,
and simplicity in the application of principles to practice. What can
be more simple than the principles of mechanics, and yet into how
many thousand forms have they been tortured by the ingenuity of
man. A few simple elementary bodies compose all the matter of
the universe, and yet how infinitely are they combined in the
various forms and substances which they assume in the animal,
vegetable, and mineral kingdoms. In like manner a few simple
principles enter into the composition of all free governments.
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These principles are perfect security for property, liberty and life;
but these principles admit of extensive combinations, when reduced
to practice:-Nay more, they require them. A despotic government
is the most simple government in the world, but instead of affording
security to property, liberty or life, it obliges us to hold them all on
the simple will of a capricious sovereign. I maintain therefore, that
all governments are safe and free in proportion as they are
compounded in a certain degree, and on the contrary, that all
governments are dangerous and tyrannical in proportion as they
approach to simplicity.
2. We are told by the friends of a single legislature, that
there can be no danger of their becoming tyrannical, since they
must partake of all the burdens they lay upon their constituents.
Here we forget the changes that are made upon the head and heart
by arbitrary power, and the cases that are recorded in history of
annual Assemblies having refused to share with their constituents
in the burdens which they had imposed upon them. If every elector
in Pennsylvania is capable of being elected an assembly-man, then
agreeably to the sixth section of the Constitution, it is possible for
an Assembly to exist who do not possess a single foot of property in
the State, and who can give no other evidence of a common interest
in, or attachment to, the community than having paid "public
taxes," which may mean poor-taxes. Should this be the case, (and
there is no obstacle in the Constitution to prevent it) surely it will
be in the power of such an Assembly to draw from the State the
whole of its wealth in a few years, without contributing any thing
further towards it than their proportion of the trifling tax necessary
to support the poor.-But I shall show in another place equal
dangers from another class of men, becoming a majority in the
Assembly.
We are told of instances of the House of Lords, in
3.
England, checking the most salutary laws, after they had passed the
House of Commons, as a proof of the inconvenience of a compound
legislature. I believed the fact to be true, but I deny its application
in the present controversy. The House of Lords, in England,
possess privileges and interests, which do not belong to the House
of Commons. Moreover they derive their power from the crown ad
not from the people. No wonder therefore they consult their own
interests, in preference to those of the People. In the State of
Pennsylvania we wish for a council, with no one exclusive privilege,
and we disclaim every idea of their possessing the smallest degree
of power, but what is derived from the annual suffrages of the
People. A body thus chosen could have no object in view but the
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happiness of their constituents. It is remarkable in Connecticut,
that the legislative council of that State has in no one instance made
amendments, or put a negative upon the acts of their Assembly, in
the course of above one hundred years, in which both have not
appeared to the people in a few months to have been calculated to
promote their liberty and happiness.
4. We are told, that the Congress is a single legislature,
therefore a single legislature is to be preferred to a compound
one.-The objects of legislation in the Congress relate only to
peace and war, alliances, trade, the Post-Office, and the government of the army and navy. They never touch the liberty, property,
nor life of the individuals of any State in their resolutions, and even
in their ordinary subjects of legislation, they are liable to be
checked by each of the Thirteen States.
5. We have been told, that a legislative council or governor
lays the foundation for aristocratical and monarchical power in a
community. However ridiculous this objection to a compound
legislature may appear, I have more than once heard it mentioned
by the advocates for a single Assembly. Who would believe, that
the same fountain of pure water should send forth, at the same
time, wholesome and deadly streams? Are not the Council and
Assembly both formed alike by the annual breath of the people?
But I will suppose, that a legislative Council aspired after the
honors of hereditary titles and power, would they not be effectually
checked by the Assembly?
I cannot help commending the zeal that appears in my
countrymen against the power of a King or a House of Lords. I
concur with them in all their prejudices against hereditary titles,
honour and power. History is little else than a recital of the follies
and vices of kings and noblemen, and it is because I dread so much
from them, that I wish to exclude them for ever from Pennsylvania,
for notwithstanding our government has been called a simple
democracy, I maintain, that a foundation is laid in it for the most
complete aristocracy that ever existed in the world.
In order to prove this assertion, I shall premise two
propositions, which have never been controverted: First, where
there is wealth, there will be power; and, secondly, the rich have
always been an over-match for the poor in all contests for power.
These truths being admitted, I desire to know what can prevent
our single representation being filled, in the course of a few years,
with a majority of rich men? Say not, the people will not choose
such men to represent them. The influence of wealth at elections is
irresistible. It has been seen and felt in Pennsylvania, and I am
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obliged in justice to my subject to say, that there are poor men
among us as prepared to be influenced, as the rich are prepared to
influence them. The fault must be laid in both cases upon human
nature. The consequence of a majority of rich men getting into the
legislature is plain. Their wealth will administer fuel to the love of
arbitrary power that is common to all men. The present Assembly
have furnished them with precedents for breaking the Constitution.
Farewell now to annual elections! Public emergencies will sanctify
the most daring measures. The clamours of their constituents will
be silenced with offices, bribes or punishments. An aristocracy will
be established, and Pennsylvania will be inhabited like most of the
countries in Europe, with only two sorts of animals, tyrants and
slaves.
It has often been said, that there is but one rank of men in
America, and therefore, that there should be only one
representation of them in a government. I agree, that we have no
artificial distinctions of men into noblemen and commoners among
us, but it ought to be remarked, that superior degrees of industry
and capacity, and above all, commerce, have introduced inequality
of property among us, and these have introduced natural
distinctions of rank in Pennsylvania, as certain and general as the
artificial distinctions of men in Europe. This will ever be the case
while commerce exists in this country. The men of middling
property and poor men can never be safe in a mixed representation
with the men of over-grown property. Their liberties can only be
secured by having exact bounds prescribed to their power, in the
fundamental principles of the Constitution. By a representation of
the men of middling fortune in one house, their whole strength is
collected against the influence of wealth.
Without such a
representation, the most violent efforts of individuals to oppose it
would be divided and broken, and would want that system, which
alone would enable them to check that lust for dominion which is
always connected with opulence. The government of Pennsylvania
therefore has been called most improperly a government for poor
men. It carries in every part of it a poison to their liberties. It is
impossible to form a government more suited to the passions and
interests of rich men.
6. But says the advocate for a single legislature, if one of the
advantages of having a Legislative Council arises from the
Counsellors possessing more wisdom than the Assembly, why may
not the members of the Council be thrown into the Assembly, in
order to instruct and enlighten them? If sound reasoning always
prevailed in popular Assemblies, this objection to a Legislative
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Council might have some weight. The danger in this case would be,
that the Counsellors would partake of the passions and prejudices
of the Assembly, by taking part in their debates; or, if they did not,
that they would be so inconsiderable in point of numbers, that they
would be constantly out-voted by the members of the Assembly.
7. But would you suffer twenty or thirty men in a Legislative
Council to control seventy or eighty in an Assembly? Yes, and that
for two reasons: First, I shall suppose that they will consist of men
of the most knowledge and experience in the State: Secondly, that
their obligations to wisdom and integrity will be much stronger than
the Assembly's can be, because fewer men will be answerable for
unjust or improper proceedings at the bar of the public. But I beg
pardon of my readers for introducing an answer to an objection to a
small number of men controlling the proceedings of a greater. The
friends of the present Constitution of Pennsylvania cannot urge this
objection with any force, for in the 47th section of the Constitution
I find twenty-four men called a COUNCIL OF CENSORS,
invested with a supreme and uncontrolled power to revise and to
censure all the laws and proceedings of not a single Assembly, but
of all the Assemblies that shall exist for seven years, which
Assemblies may contain the united wisdom of five hundred and
four Assembly-men. They are moreover, invested with more
wisdom than the Convention that is to be chosen by their
recommendation; for this Convention, which is to consist of
seventy-two men, is to make no one alteration in the Constitution
but what was suggested to them by the Council of Censors. I can
easily conceive that two houses consisting of an unequal number of
members, both viewing objects through the same medium of time
and place, may agree in every thing essential, and disagree in
matters only of doubtful issue to the welfare of the state; but I am
sure, a body of twenty-four men sitting in judgment upon the
proceedings of a body of men defunct in their public capacity seven
years before them, cannot fail of committing the most egregious
mistakes from the obscurity which time, and their ignorance of a
thousand facts and reasonings must throw upon all their
deliberations. But more of the arbitrary power of the Censors
hereafter.
8. We are told that the State of Pennsylvania has always
been governed by a single legislature, and therefore, that part of
our Constitution is not an innovation. There is a short way of
confuting this assertion by pronouncing it without any foundation.
The Governor always had a negative power upon our laws, and was
a distinct branch of our legislature. It is true, he sometimes
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exercised his power to the disadvantage of the people; for he was
the servant of a King who possessed an interest distinct from that of
his people, and in some cases the Governor himself possessed an
interest incompatible with the rights of the people. God forbid that
ever we should see a resurrection of his power in Pennsylvania, but
I am obliged to own, that I have known instances in which the
whole state have thanked him for the interposition of his negative
and amendments upon the acts of the Assembly. Even the
Assembly-men themselves have acknowledged the justice of his
conduct upon these occasions, by condemning in their cooler hours
their own hasty, and ill-digested resolutions.
9.
But why all these arguments in favor of checks for the
Assembly. The Constitution (says the single legislative-man) has
provided no less than four for them. First, Elections will be annual.
Secondly, The doors of the Assembly are to be always open.
Thirdly, All laws are to be published for the consideration and
assent of the people: And, Fourthly, The Council of Censors will
punish, by their censures, all violations of the Constitution, and the
authors of bad laws. I shall examine the efficacy of each of these
checks separately.
I hope, for the peace of the state, that we shall never see a
body of men in power more attached to the present Constitution
than the present Assembly, and if, with all their affection for it, they
have broken it in many articles, it is reasonable to suppose that
future Assemblies will use the same freedoms with it. They may, if
they choose, abolish annual elections."
They may tell their
constituents that elections draw off the minds of the people from
necessary labour; or, if a war should exist, they may show the
impossibility of holding elections when there is a chance of the
militia being called into the field to oppose a common enemy: Or
lastly, they may fetter elections with oaths in such a manner as to
exclude nine-tenths of the electors from voting. Such stratagems
for perpetual power will never want men nor a society of men to
support them; for the Assembly possesses such a plenitude of
power from the influence of the many offices of profit and honour2
11. The late Convention was chosen for the sole purpose of making a
government, and was composed of honest, well-meaning men, and yet, I have good
authority to say, that several of them proposed to their friends forming themselves
into an Assembly, to execute the government.
12. The President is appointed chiefly by the Assembly. His salary, together
with the salaries of the Judges, are fixed by the Assembly. Delegates in Congress,
the Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants of counties, Protonotaries, Registers of Wills,
Money-Signers, &c. &c. are all appointed solely by the Assembly. Each of these
officers brings with him the influence of his friends and family-connections. When
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that are in their gift, that they may always promise themselves
support from a great part of the state. But I will suppose that no
infringement is ever made upon annual elections. In the course of
even one year a single Assembly may do the most irreparable
mischief to a state. Socrates and Barnevelt were both put to death
by Assemblies that held their powers at the election of the people.
The same Assemblies would have shed oceans of tears to have
recalled those illustrious citizens to life again, in less than half a
year after they imbrued their hands in their blood.
I am highly pleased with having the doors of our Assembly
kept constantly open; but how can this check the proceedings of the
Assembly, when none but a few citizens of the town or county,
where the Assembly sits, or a few travelling strangers, can ever
attend or watch them?
I shall take no notice of the delays of business, which must
arise from publishing all laws for the consideration and assent of
the people; but I beg to be informed how long they must be
published before they are passed? For I take it for granted, that
each county has a right to equal degrees of time to consider of the
laws. In what manner are they to be circulated? How are the
sentiments of the people, scattered over a county fifty or sixty miles
in extent, to be collected? Whether by ballot, or by voting in a
tumultuary manner? These are insurmountable difficulties in the
way of the people at large acting as a check upon the Assembly.
But supposing an attempt should be made to restrain the single
legislature in this manner, are we sure the disapprobation of the
people would be sufficient to put a negative upon improper or
arbitrary laws? Would not the Assembly, from their partiality to
their own proceedings, be apt to pass over the complaints of the
people in silence? to neglect or refuse to enter their petitions or
remonstrances upon their Journals? or to raise the hue and cry of a
fostered junto upon them, as "tories," or "apostate Whigs," or "an
aristocraticfaction?"
To talk of the Councils of Censors, as a check upon the
Assembly, is to forget that a man or a body of men may deceive,
rob, and enslave the public for seven years, and then may escape
the intended efficacy of the censures of the Council by death, or by
flying into a neighbouring state.
10. We are informed that a single legislature was supported in
the Convention by Dr. Franklin, and assented to by Mr.
Rittenhouse; gentlemen distinguished for their uncommon abilities,
collected together, they make a little army of placemen.
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and deservedly dear for their virtues to every lover of human
nature. The only answer, after what has been said, that I shall give
to this argument, is, that Divine Providence seems to have
permitted them to err upon this subject, in order to console the
world for the very great superiority they both possess over the rest
of mankind in every thing else, except the science of government.
Thus have I answered all the arguments that ever I have heard
offered in favour of a single legislature, and I hope, silenced all the
objections that have been made to a double representation of the
people. I might here appeal further to the practice of our courts of
law in favour of repeated deliberations and divisions. In a free
government, the most inconsiderable portion of our liberty and
property cannot be taken from us, without the judgment of two or
three courts; but, by the Constitution of Pennsylvania, the whole of
our liberty and property, and even our lives, may be taken from us,
by the hasty and passionate decision of a single Assembly.
I shall conclude my observations upon this part of the
Constitution, by summing up the advantages of a compound or
double legislature.
1. There is the utmost freedom in a compound legislature.
The decisions of two legislative bodies cannot fail of coinciding with
the wills of a great majority of the community.
2. There is safety in such a government, in as much as each
body possesses a free and independent power, so that they mutually
check ambition and usurpation in each other.
3. There is the greatest wisdom in such a government. Every
act being obliged to undergo the revision and amendments of two
bodies of men, is necessarily strained of every mixture of folly,
passion, and prejudice.'3
4. There is the longest duration of freedom in such a
government."
5. There is the most order in such a government. By order, I
mean obedience to laws, subordination to magistrates, civility and

13. The Militia Law of the Delaware State received twenty-four amendments
from the Council after it had had three readings in the Assembly; all of which were
adopted at once by the Assembly. I grant, the wisdom of men collected in any way
that can be devised, cannot make a perfect law; but I am sure a Legislative Council
would not have overlooked many inaccuracies in the laws passed in the last session
of the present Assembly of Pennsylvania.
14. Sparta, which possessed a compound legislature, preserved her liberties
above five hundred years. The fatal dissentions of Athens and Rome ceased as
soon as their Senates, which were fulled only with rich men, were checked by
another Representation of the people.
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decency of behaviour, and the contrary of every thing like mobs
and factions.
Compound governments are most agreeable to human nature,
inasmuch as they afford the greatest scope for the expansion of the
powers and virtues of the mind. Wisdom, learning, experience, with
the most extensive benevolence, the most unshaken firmness, and
the utmost elevation of soul, are all called into exercise by the
opposite and different duties of the different representations of the
people.
Letter III
The powers of government have been very justly divided into
legislative, executive and judicial. Having discussed the legislative
power of the government of Pennsylvania, I shall proceed now to
consider the executive and judicial.
It is agreed on all hands that the executive and judicial powers
of government should be wholly independent of the legislative. The
authors of the Pennsylvania Constitution seem to have given their
sanction to this opinion, by separating those powers from the
powers of the Assembly. -It becomes us to enquire whether they
have made them so independent of the Assembly as to give them
the free exercise of their own judgments.
The insignificant figure the President and Council make in the
Constitution from not having a negative upon the laws of the
Assembly, alone would soon have destroyed their authority and
influence in the State. But the authors of the Constitution have
taken pains to throw the whole power of the Council at once into
the hands of the Assembly, by rendering the former dependent
upon the latter in the two following particulars.
1. The President is chosen by the joint ballot of the
Assembly and Council. The Assembly being to the Council, in
point of numbers, as five are to one, of course, choose the
President. Each member will expect in his turn to fill the first chair
in the State, and hence the whole Council will yield themselves up
to the will of the Assembly.
2. The salaries of the President and of each of the
Counsellors are fixed by the Assembly. This will necessarily render
them dependant upon them. It is worthy of notice here, that a
rotation is established in the 19th section of the Constitution, to
"prevent the danger of an inconvenient aristocracy."-From what
abuse of power can this aristocracy arise? Are they not the
creatures of the Assembly? But there is a magic terror in the sound
of a Counsellor. Call a man an Assemblyman, or a Censor, and he
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becomes an innocent creature, though you invest him with the
despotism of an Eastern monarch. If the Council are dependant
upon the Assembly, it follows of course that the Judges, who are
appointed by the Council, are likewise dependant upon them. But
in order more fully to secure their dependance upon the will of the
Assembly, they are obliged to hold their salaries upon the tenure of
their will. In vain do they hold their commissions for seven years.
This is but the shadow of independance. They cannot live upon the
air, and their absolute dependance upon the Assembly gives that
body a transcendent influence over all the courts of law in the State.
Here then we have discovered the legislative, executive and judicial
powers of the State all blended together.-The liberty, the property
and life of every individual in the State are laid prostrate by the
Constitution at the feet of the Assembly. This combination of
powers in one body has in all ages been pronounced a tyranny. To
live by one man's will became the cause of all men's misery; but
better, far better, would it be to live by the will of one man, than to
live, or rather to die, by the will of a body of men. Unhappy
Pennsylvania! Methinks I see the scales of justice broken in thy
courts.-I see the dowry of the widow and the portion of the
orphans unjustly taken from them, in order to gratify the avarice of
some demagogue who rules the Assembly by his eloquence and
arts.-I see the scaffolds streaming with the blood of the wisest and
best men in the State.-I see the offices of government-But the
prospect is too painful, I shall proceed to take notice of some other
parts of the Constitution.
It was not sufficient to contaminate justice at its fountain, but
its smallest streams are made to partake of impurity by the
Convention. In the 30th section of the Constitution "all Justices of
the Peace are to be elected by the freeholders of each city and
county." The best observations that can be made on this part of the
Constitution is to inform the public, that not above one half the
people of the State chose magistrates agreeable to the laws of the
Assembly for that purpose; that more than one half of those that
were chosen have refused to accept of commissions, and that many
of those who act are totally disqualified from the want of education
or leisure for the office.-It has been said often, and I wish the
saying was engraven over the doors of every statehouse on the
Continent, that "all power is derived from the people," but it has
never yet been said that all power is seated in the people.
Government supposes and requires a delegation of power: It cannot
exist without it. And the idea of making the people at large judges
of the qualifications necessary for magistrates, or judges of laws, or
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checks for Assemblies proceeds upon the supposition that mankind
are all alike wise, and just, and have equal leisure. It moreover
destroys the necessity for all government. What man ever made
himself his own attorney? And yet this would not be more absurd
than for the people at large to pretend to give up their power to a
set of rulers, and afterwards reserve the right of making and of
judging of all their laws themselves. Such a government is a
monster in nature. It contains as many Governors, Assemblymen,
Judges and Magistrates as there are freemen in the State, all
exercising the same powers and at the same time. Happy would it
be for us, if this monster was remarkable only for his absurdity; but,
alas! he contains a tyrant in his bowels. All history shows us that
the people soon grow weary of the folly and tyranny of one
another. They prefer one to many masters, and stability to
instability of slavery. They prefer a Julius Caesar to a Senate, and a
Cromwell to a perpetual Parliament.
I cannot help thinking a mistake lays rather in words than ideas
when we talk of the rights of the people. Where is the difference
between my choosing a Justice of Peace, and my choosing an
Assemblyman and a Counsellor, by whose joint suffrages a
Governor is chosen, who appoints a Justice for me? I am still the
first link of the sacred chain of the power of the State. But are
there no cases in which I may be bound by acts of a single, or of a
body of magistrates in the State, whom I have had no hand in
choosing? Yes, there are. Here then I am bound contrary to the
principles of liberty (which consist in a man being governed by men
chosen by himself), whereas if all the magistrates in the State were
appointed by the Governor, or executive part of the State, it would
be impossible for me to appear before the bar of a magistrate any
where who did not derive his power originallyfrom me.
By the 5th section all militia officers below the rank of a
Brigadier General are to be chosen by the people. Most of the
objections that have been mentioned against magistrates being
chosen by the people, apply with equal force against the people's
choosing their military officers. By the militia law of this State we
find the soldier ceases to be commanded by the officer of his choice
as soon as he comes in the field. He might as well be commanded
by an officer of another State as by one of his own States, for whom
he did not vote. Had he been appointed by the executive power of
the government, he might have looked upon him originally as the
creature of his own power, and might have claimed his care in the
camp, from his influence at elections, in moving those springs in
government, from which he derived his commission. But the
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unsuitableness of this part of the Constitution to the genius of the
people of Pennsylvania, will appear in the strongest point of light,
from attending to the two following facts: 1st: Most of the
irregularities committed by the militia, that were in service last
year, were occasioned by that laxity of discipline, which was
introduced and kept up by officers holding their commissions by the
breath of the people: And 2dly, Above one half of the State have
refused or neglected to choose officers, agreeably to the
recommendation of the Assembly.-And even in many of those
places, where elections for officers have been held, Colonels have
been chosen by forty and Captains and Subalterns by only four or
five votes.
In the 22nd section of the Constitution it is said, "every officer
of the state, whether judicial or executive, shall be liable to be
impeached by the General Assembly, before the President and
Council, either when in office or after his resignation or removal for
maladministration." Why is a man in this case to be deprived of a
trial by jury? and what is the reason that no time is fixed for the
commencement of this impeachment after resignation or removal
for maladministration?
A judicial or military officer may be
innocent, and yet, from the delay of his trial for six or seven years,
he may be deprived by death or other ways of the vouchers of his
innocence. Woe to the man that ever holds one of the high offices
of the State of Pennsylvania! He must ever, after his resignation,
hold his life at the pleasure of the orator who rules the Assembly.
The least mark of disrespect shown to him, or to any of the
Assembly, rouses the Constitution and laws of his country against
him; and perhaps, after an interval of twenty or thirty years
conscious integrity, his grey hairs are dragged with sorrow to the
grave. Let not this be thought to be too high a picture of this part
of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. It is a picture of human nature
in similar circumstances, in every age and country. Men possessed
of unlimited and uncontrolled power are beasts of prey.
But is there no power lodged in the Constitution to alter these
imperfections? Has our Convention monopolized all the wisdom of
succeeding years, so as to preclude any improvements being made
in the infant science of government? must we groan away our lives
in a patient submission to all the evils in the Constitution which
have been described?
Let the 47th and last section of the
Constitution answer these questions. By this section it is declared,
that after the expiration of seven years, there shall "be chosen two
men from each city and county, (a majority of whom shall be a
quorum in every case, except as to calling a Convention) who shall
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be called a Council of Censors, and who shall have power to call a
Convention within two years after their sitting, if there appears to
them an absolute necessity of amending any article of the
Constitution which may be defective, explaining such as may be
thought not clearly expressed, and of adding such as are necessary
for the preservation of the rights and happiness of the people."
From this paragraph it is evident, that the Constitution was thought
to be the perfection of human wisdom, and that the authors of it
intended that it should last for ever. Every section of the
Constitution, I believe, was determined by a majority of the
Members of the Convention, and in the 12th section of the
Constitution we find, that if only two-thirds of the people concur in
the execution of it, the members of Assembly chosen by them, are
to "possess all the powers of the General Assembly as fully and
amply as if the whole were present." This is strictly agreeable to
the principles of good government; but, why are these principles to
be trampled upon, when the great question is to be agitated,
whether the Constitution shall be altered? For, unless every county
and city in the State concur in electing Censors, and unless two
thirds of them agree in calling a Convention, there is no possibility
of obtaining an alteration of a single article of the Constitution. If
the Assembly had not taught us that it was neither treason nor
perjury to break the Constitution, I am sure it would have remained
inviolate for ever; for I am persuaded that several of the counties
would have refused to have chosen Censors. But suppose they had,
if only one short of two thirds of them refused to agree in the
measure, we could have no Convention. The minority would give
laws to a majority. A solecism in government! But there is no end
to the tyranny and absurdity of our Constitution.
But the Council of Censors have not yet finished their
business. They are empowered by the Constitution "to enquire,
whether the Constitution has been preserved inviolate in every part?

and whether the legislative and executive branches of government
have performed their duty, as guardians of the people; or assumed
to themselves, or exercised other or greater powers than they are
entitled to by the Constitution: They are also to enquire, whether
the public taxes have been justly laid and collected in all parts of
this commonwealth;-in what manner the public monies have been
disposed of, and whether the laws have been duly executed: For
these purposes they shall have power to send for persons, papers
and records; they shall have authority to pass public censures, and
to recommend to the legislature, the repealing such laws as appear
to them to have been enacted contrary to the principles of the
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Constitution: These powers they shall continue to have for, and
during the space of one year, from the day of their election, and no
longer."
Is this the commission of the Grand Turk? or is it an extract
from an act of the British Parliament, teeming with vengeance
against the liberties of America?-No.-It is an epitome of the
powers of the Council of Censors established by the late
Convention of Pennsylvania. Innocence has nothing to fear from
justice, when it flows through the regular channels of law; but
where is the man who can ensure himself a moment's safety from a
body of men invested with absolute power for one whole year to
censure and condemn, without judge or jury, every individual in the
State. I shall suppose the Council to consist of a majority of those
Members of Assembly, who took the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution, and who voted, that no officer should be excused
from taking it, who accepted of a militia-commission under the
authority of this State. I shall suppose them assembled for the
business of their office. The work of an age is to be performed in a
single year. -Methinks I see such of those worthy gentlemen as are
living, who, for the sake of union, consented to dispense with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution, led like criminals to their
bar.-I hear peals of wrath denounced against them. I see those
virtuous gentlemen, who composed the Executive Council in the
year 1777, summoned to appear at their tribunal, to answer for their
having abdicated the duties of their office, by an adjournment, at a
time when the State was threatened with an invasion. In vain they
plead, that the Constitution had invested them with no power for
the defence of the State. Their names and their families are
branded with infamy by a "public censure." I see hundreds and
thousands coming, one after another, before the Council, to be
censured for refusing to choose magistrates and militia-officers,
agreeably to the laws of the Assembly. But who are they who are
dragged with so much violence to the inquisitorial tribunal? They
are a number of citizens who prayed for some alterations to be
made in the Constitution. In vain they plead the obligations of
reason and conscience against submitting to the government. In
vain they plead their zeal and services in the common cause of
America. It is all to no purpose. They recommend to the Assembly
to impeach them for high treason. They are condemned as traitors,
and the streets swim with their blood.-Good heavens! where was
the mild genius of Pennsylvania, when this part of the Constitution
obtained the assent of the Convention? -Spirit of liberty, whither
wast thou fled? -
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But perhaps the Constitution has provided a remedy for its
defects, without the aid of the Council of Censors? No-this
cannot be done; for every Member of Assembly, before he takes his
seat, is obliged, by the 10th section of the Constitution, to swear
that he will not "do nor consent to any act whatever, that shall have
a tendency to lessen or abridge their rights and privileges as
declared in the Constitution of this State," as also, "that he will not

directly or indirectly do or consent to any act or thing prejudicial or
injurious to the Constitution or Government thereof, as established
by the Convention," agreeably to the 40th section of the
Constitution. These oaths of infallability and passive obedience to
the form of the Constitution, effectually preclude every man, who
holds an office under it, from attempting to procure the least
amendment in any part of it. 5 It is a mere quibble upon words to
say, that a man may mend the Constitution, without "doing any
thing prejudicial or injurious to it." The Convention did not intend
any such construction to be put upon their oaths, and hence we find
in the introduction to the Constitution, they "declare the frame of
government to be the Constitution of this commonwealth, and to
remain in force therein forever, unaltered, except in such articles as
shall hereafter, upon experience, be found to require improvement,
and which shall, by the same authority of the people fairly
delegated, as this frame of government directs, be amended and
improved." Now we know, that the frame of government forbids
the least amendment being made in the Constitution in any other
than by the recommendation of a Council of Censors.
Had the Constitution appeared to me to have been
unexceptionable in every part, and had it been the result of the
united wisdom of men and angels, I would not have taken an oath
of passive obedience to it, for seven or nine years. The constant
changes in human affairs, and in the dispositions of a people, might
render occasional alterations, in that time, necessary in the most
perfect Constitution. But to take an oath of allegiance to a
Constitution,-full of experiments,-a Constitution that was indeed
a new thing under the sun,-that had never been tried in some of its
15. That it was the design of the Convention, that the Constitution should not
be touched by any power but a Convention to be called by the Council of Censors,
appears from the oath contained in the 40th section, being required by one of their
ordinances as the only condition upon which an Elector could vote for an
Assemblyman. Strange! that men should call God to witness their determination
to support a government, which a majority of them had not seen, and which even
the minority of them did not understand or disliked! But, for the honour of the
State it should be recorded, that not above 1500 of the 2500, who voted for the
Assembly, took the oath required by the ordinance of the Convention.
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parts in any country, -and that had produced misery in other of its
parts in every country.-I say to swear to support or even to submit,
for seven or nine years, to such a Constitution, is to trifle with all
morality, and to dishonour the sacred name of God himself.
What would you think of a man, who would consent to shut his
eyes, and swallow a quantity of food that had never before been
tasted by a human creature, and swear at the same time, that if it
should disorder him in ever so great a degree, he would take
nothing to relieve him for eight and forty hours? Such a man would
be wise, compared with the man who takes an oath of allegiance to
the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
It is to no purpose to talk here of the many excellent articles in
the Bill of Rights; such as religious toleration,-the habeas corpus
act, - trials by juries,-the rotation of office, &c. None of them can
flourish long in the neighbourhood of a single Assembly, and a
Council of Censors possessing all the powers of the State.-These
inestimable privileges in the Constitution of Pennsylvania resemble
a tree loaded with the most luscious fruit, but surrounded with
thorns, in such a manner, as to be for ever inaccessible to the
hungry traveller.
Perhaps, while the government is upon its good behaviour, and
while the passions of the State are directed against a cruel and
common enemy, we may not experience all the calamities that have
been demonstrated to flow from the Constitution. -But the
revolution of a few years, and the return of peace, will most
certainly render Pennsylvania, under her present Constitution, the
most miserable spot upon the surface of the globe.
I believe all the Members of the late Convention were true
Whigs, and aimed sincerely at forming a free and happy
government: But, I am sure, that if Filmar and Hobbes had sat
among them, they could not have formed a government more
destructive of human happiness; nor could Lord North or General
Howe have formed one more destructive of union and vigour, in
our public affairs, than the present Constitution of Pennsylvania.
It is one thing to understand the principles, and another thing
to understand the forms of government. The former are simple; the
latter are difficult and complicated. There is the same difference
Who
between principles and forms in all other sciences.
than
Sir
optics
better
mechanics
and
principles
of
understood the
Isaac Newton? and yet Sir Isaac could not for his life have made a
watch or a microscope. Mr. Locke is an oracle as to the principles,
Harrington and Montesquieu are oracles as to the forms of
government.
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Letter IV
A question very naturally arises from taking a review of the
tyranny of the government of Pennsylvania, what measures shall be
taken to amend them? There can be but two answers to this
question. 1st. To submit to the Constitution for the present, till a
peace with Great Britain will give us leisure to make a better; or,
2dly, to call a Convention immediately for the purpose of making a
new Constitution. I believe the State is divided only about these
two things; for the party who believe the government to be a good
one, is to inconsiderable to be noticed in this place.
I.
I beg leave to offer a few objections to our submitting to
the Constitution, and shall endeavour, II. to obviate the objections
that have been made to the immediate calling of a Convention, for
the purpose of altering and amending it.
I.
There is the utmost danger to the State of Pennsylvania to
a temporary submission to the Constitution from the following
causes, 1. The Government is a tyranny. The moment we submit to
it we become slaves. We hold every thing dear to us in society upon
the tenure of the will of a single man in a single Assembly. Perhaps
the mark of the beast may not be fixed immediately upon us, but
the contract is made, and we are sold, together with our posterity,
to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for ever. 2. The
Constitution cannot be executed in part without being broken.
Now there cannot be a more dangerous precedent in a free country,
than a legislature violating in a single article even the forms of a
Constitution. 3. The present government will not draw forth the
wisdom nor strength of the State, nor afford that assistance to our
Sister States which is expected from us in the present contest with
Great Britain. Wise and good men every where decline to accept of
the first offices in the government. The militia law is only partially
executed. We have no courts of justice open for the sequestration
or confiscation of Tory property; and, lastly, we shall never be able
under the present government to contribute our share towards
sinking the Continental debt by taxes. There is not force enough in
the whole State to draw taxes from a single county against their
consent.16 Alas! we are on the brink of ruin. Our State has lifted a
16. The gentlemen in the opposition to the government have constantly
prayed, that the Constitution might be referred to the arbitration of a Convention,
and have declared their willingness to submit to, or concur in the execution of it, if
it should be confirmed by a representation of the people fairly chosen. I am sorry
to find upon the Journals of the Assembly, an address from a battalion of militia in
Chester county, to the Honourable House, assuring them, that "they will support
the present government with their lives and fortunes." Such addresses indicated
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knife to her throat, and is about to undo herself by a hasty and illjudged exercise of her own power. Our enemies are exulting, and
our friends are weeping over our alarming situation. Our ancestors
look down, and our posterity look up to us for a happier
Constitution. We are engaged with our Sister States in a bloody
and expensive war. The liberty of the whole world is the price for
which we fight. Human nature looks to us to avenge the mighty ills
she has suffered from the tyrants of the old world. She has already
dropped a tear of joy upon the prospect of recovering among us her
first and original dignity. A good government is an engine not less
necessary to ensure us success in these glorious purposes than
ammunition and fire-arms. The way of duty is plain. Let a
Convention be chosen, to alter and amend the government. This
measure alone will restore vigor and union to Pennsylvania. Say
not, my dear countrymen, THIS IS NOT THE TIME, THE
ENEMY ARE AT OUR GATES, LET US FIRST REPEL
THEM. Look at our militia on a field day-see the attempts of the
friends to the Constitution to open our courts-hear the complaints
and murmurs of the people. They all proclaim that now is the time
for altering our Constitution. No confusion can arise from it. The
gentlemen in the opposition declare their determination to support
the present Assembly in the execution of every law necessary for
the safety and defence of the State, and above all in the execution
of the militia and test laws. They have no interest unconnected
with yours. They see with the same distress as you do the Tories
triumphing in our disunion. Be not deceived. The Tories are not
enemies to the present government; they enjoy the benefits of its
weakness, and there is good authority to say they have secretly
helped to carry it into execution. Let us beware of being imposed
upon by the popular cry of the necessity of the times. When the
Dissenters in Virginia and South Carolina prayed for the abolition
of the Episcopal establishment in those States, the High
Churchmen acknowledged that their demands were just, but said,
that this was not the time for attending to them, and that such a
change in the government would throw all things into confusion.
The demands were notwithstanding complied with, and an union
the weakness, and foreboded the present contemptible situation of the court of
Britain. They were presented in times similar to our own, viz. when the American
colonies were upon their knees to the throne, praying to be governed by their own
But it is
representatives, and to be delivered from impending slavery.
characteristic of the present Constitution, that, in the first year of its execution, the
journals of our rulers were stained with threats of bloodshed, against men who
only petitioned for a redress of grievances.
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unparalleled in former times was immediately produced in those
States. When a declaration of independence last summer appeared
to be the only measure that could save America, the Tories and
moderate men acknowledged the justice of our separation from
Great Britain, but said, "This is not the time." The event showed
that the time was come, for, exclusive of the advantages we have
gained from it in foreign Courts, it served to precipitate the timid,
the doubtful and the disaffected characters from their mixture with
the real Whigs, and although it lessened the numbers in the
opposition, it added to their strength by producing union and
decision among them. To delay justice (has been emphatically said)
is to deny it. In like manner to delay liberty is to take it away.
The Convention of New York formed their government within
the reach of the thunder of the enemy's cannon, and while one half
of their State was in their possession. Is our situation more
The members of the late
dangerous than it was last year?
Convention were chosen on a day when the Associators of the
whole State were in motion. The Constitution was made while
above 5000 of them were in the field. The sense of the people was
not asked upon the subject of the Constitution; but it was given in
the most public manner. No more than 1500 freemen voted for its
being executed, for that number only took the oath of allegiance to
the Constitution at the election in October. Let us talk no more
then of the "necessity of the times." This is the State apology at St.
James's for all the crimes of the present reign and for all the
ravages and bloodshed we have witnessed in America. The State of
Massachusetts Bay are preparing for an invasion; they expect
General Burgoyne every hour in their harbours with a powerful
army, and yet in a Boston paper, of the 5th of May, I find the
following resolution of their Assembly and Council,
STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY.
In the HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES, May 5,1777.
"Resolved, That it be, and hereby is recommended to the
several towns and places in this State, impowered by the laws
thereof, to send Members to the General Assembly, that, at their
next election of a Member or Members to represent them, they
make choice of men, in whose integrity and abilities they can place
the greatest confidence; and, in addition to the common and
ordinary powers of representation, instruct them in one Body with
the Council, to form such a Constitution of Government, as they
shall judge best calculated to promote the happiness of this State;
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and when completed, to cause the same to be printed in all the
Boston News-Papers, and also in Hand-Bills, one of which to be
transmitted to the Selectmen of each town, or the Committee of
each plantation, to be by them laid before their respective towns or
plantations, at a regular meeting of the inhabitants thereof, to be
called for that purpose; in order to its being, by each town and
plantation, duly considered. And a return of their approbation or
disapprobation to be made into the Secretary's Office of this State,
at a reasonable time to be fixed on by the General Court, specifying
the numbers present in such meeting, voting for, and those voting
against the same: And if, upon a fair examination of the said
returns by the General Court, or such Committee as they shall
appoint for that purpose, it shall appear, that the said Form of
Government is approved of by at least two thirds of those who are
free, and twenty one years of age, belonging to this State, and
present in the several meetings, then the General Court shall be
impowered to establish the same as the Constitution and Form of
Government of the State of Massachusetts Bay, according to which
the inhabitants thereof shall be governed in all succeeding
generations, unless the same shall be altered by their own express
direction, or that of at least two thirds of them. And it is further
recommended to the Selectmen of the several towns, in the return
of their precepts for the choice of Representatives, to signify their
having considered this Resolve, and their doings thereon."
But further, recollect, my dear countrymen, our conduct upon
reading the resolution of the Honourable Congress of the 15th of
May, 1776. We seized it as a Warrant that proclaimed liberty to us
and our posterity for ever. It was said by some people at that time,
"Let the Assembly execute that resolution;" but we spurned the
advice, and we acted like men. We said, that the "Assembly was
not chosen by a majority of votes in the State," owing to the
inequality of our representation, and that they wanted the
"confidence of the people." We thought nothing then of the loss of
time occasioned by the meeting of a Conference of Committees, to
settle the mode and time of choosing a Convention. The delay of
months, the distractions of the State, and the danger of an invasion,
were thought to be trifling when compared with the prospect of a.
good Constitution, that should immediately collect and exert the
Whig strength of the state.
Thus have I finished my observations upon the Constitution of
Pennsylvania. I have taken notice only of its most essential defects,
and have aimed to discuss them with candor. The occasional
remarks upon the proceedings of the Assembly, are to be charged
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entirely to the faults of the Constitution. - I believe the gentlemen
in power have nothing in view but the freedom and independance
of the State; and such has been the zeal and integrity of many of
them in the pursuit of those great objects, that it gives me pain to
reflect, that I have been obliged to differ from them in the best
means of obtaining them.
With this declaration I shall close my letters to the people of
Pennsylvania. Accept thou dear asylum of my ancestors, nurse of
my infancy, protectress of my childhood, and generous rewarder of
the toils of my youth, accept of these humble efforts to restore thee
to freedom and happiness! If I have laboured in vain, I shall
henceforth mourn in secret only over my beloved country, and
lament the day that I was born a Pennsylvanian.

